

A

SUCCINCT REVIEW

OF THE

AMERICAN CONTEST,

5

ADDRESSED

TO THOSE WHOM IT MAY CONCERN.

BY Z E R O.

First published in February, 1778, while the BILLS called
CONCILIATORY were under the Consideration of
the House of Commons.



————— *En quo discordia cives*
Perduxit miseros! —————

VIRGIL.

L O N D O N:

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1782

P R E F A C E.

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vi P R E F A C E

are most simple and obvious. How it came to pass that truths so obvious were disregarded in transactions of such importance is a very curious enquiry; but, as it leads into matter much too extensive for the Preface to so small a work, must be reserved for some other occasion.

In the mean while, let me turn to what is more immediately useful, by observing that though the plan of warfare recommended in the following paper cannot be executed with the same ease and security that it might have been at the time it was first suggested, yet the general principle on which it is founded has not ceased to be true; and the plan may still be made practicable, by the help of a few changes in its mode, in compliance with the changes which have happened in our situation.

There

P R E F A C E.

vii

There are, for instance, ten thousand soldiers allotted by it for desultory expeditions; a number which, in the present reduced state of our American army, could not be spared. But it was the opinion of officers of great skill in war, and particularly acquainted with the geography and circumstances of America, that the half of that number was sufficient for the purpose; and that a greater body of troops would be rather embarrassing than useful. The coast of America is, in general, no better guarded than it was before the French entered openly into the alliance; nor is it possible to secure it from naval insult. The great difference in our situation is in what relates to the sea; for the land forces, let them have been more or less, might have been formerly escorted by a few frigates, where now

a large naval force would be necessary. But this superiority of naval force must be provided at every possible expence, or else we must bid adieu, not only to the sovereignty of America, but to the independency of Great Britain. Our proclaiming to our enemies *that we must make peace with them, because we are no longer able to carry on the war,* may serve to raise their laughter or contempt, but will never move their compassion. The language upon such occasions, will always be VÆ VICTIS.

London, Feb. 23, 1782.

A
SUCCINCT REVIEW
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ADDRESSED

To those whom it may concern.

WHEN a State is involved in difficulties and dangers at which its usual Conductors stand aghast and confounded, it becomes the duty of every member of the community, however humble his station, to suggest to persons in authority whatever he thinks may be expedient for the public safety. The more obscure the adviser, the less danger can result from the advice; as it can receive no weight from his name or character, and has no chance of being followed but from its own consistency, and the good reasons he is able to produce in its support.

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I shall therefore make no farther apology for the presumption of this address, but shall proceed to explain the drift of it with all the brevity which the extensiveness and importance of the subject will permit.

The political affairs of this country have exhibited within these few years a scene to which nothing precisely similar is to be found in history ; and concerning the event of which history cannot of consequence furnish us with any probable conjecture. The Romans, indeed, in the last century of their freedom, had, like us, their Cinna, their Clodius, and many other such like patriots, who, for the support of their ambitious schemes, corrupted the common people, and rendered them seditious and ungovernable. The Romans had, like us, a bloody war to maintain for years, called the Social War, against their own provinces and colonies, stirred up and encouraged by factious men from within the walls of Rome itself ; and in all which contests Liberty, the Republic, and the Rights of mankind, were the constant pretexts.

We

We all know, however, that these fierce struggles for universal liberty were finished by the establishment of the most despotic government ever known. But still their circumstances were, in many respects, different from ours ; and our disputes may not end in the same manner, or perhaps so well. The Romans were altogether a military people, who made no account of merchandize as a matter of state ; who were totally unacquainted with public debts, and with paper money ; who conquered countries for the sake of the tributes to be raised from them, and who planted colonies only for the better securing those conquests. But the greatest and most important difference between their circumstances and ours was, that they had no powerful neighbour ready to avail themselves of their divisions ; so that they could only terminate in establishing one or other of the political antagonists at the head of the Roman government, while Rome was sure in every event of continuing mistress of the world. A man must belie his own feelings, as well as be

grossly ignorant in political arithmetic, who will assert that the fate of the antient Romans is the worst that can befall a free people, or that a despotic power established by any nation from within itself, is not preferable to a like despotic power exercised over it by a foreign State. The history of the Carthaginians, even in the imperfect manner in which it has been handed down down to us, furnishes an account of affairs much more resembling ours than were those of the Romans, and of which the event was much more fatal. For they were a mercantile people, who maintained fleets, and armies of foreign mercenaries, chiefly out of the profits of their trade and manufactures ; who conquered distant countries and planted colonies chiefly for the purpose of enlarging their circle of monopoly ; and who, not having public spirit and unanimity sufficient for the government of such extensive dominions, nor any supreme magistracy of sufficient authority to compel them to a consistency of conduct, were soon vanquished by their more united rivals, the Romans,

Romans, who first imposed upon them the most humiliating terms of peace, and then expunged them altogether from the list of nations.

When a physician is about to prescribe an unpalatable medicine, it becomes often necessary for him to lay open to his patient the great danger of his distemper, in order to induce him to swallow it. For a like cause I have brought forth these melancholy examples from antient history, being thoroughly convinced, that as the dignity of the British nation will be lost, so its independency will be in the utmost danger, whenever the Americans are able by force of arms to establish theirs.

Those, therefore, who, calling themselves Englishmen, labour to promote American independency, can be only considered as secret enemies to this country, or else as madmen, who inflamed with envy and disappointed ambition, utter sounds, and engage in transactions of which they do not perceive the meaning and tendency. But all these avowed advocates for American independency

independency carry, like the rattle snake, their warning about with them; and by the excess of their malice or folly put it in our power to avoid the consequences of them. Much more is to be feared from another set of people, who hold a language that has an appearance of moderation, and is much more dangerous, by being much more plausible; I mean those who advise us to give up all pretensions to an unconditional submission from the Americans, and to enter into covenants with them. If rage has damaged the understandings of the first set of people, fear seems to have had upon the last a no less baneful influence; for a man must be perfectly ignorant of the first rudiments of state affairs who does not know that no sovereign power can enter into a binding or indissoluble agreement with those who are acknowledged to be its subjects; and that history does not furnish an example of such conditions being insisted upon, without producing a war, which has terminated either in absolute independency, or unlimited obedience. This assertion is
not

not only founded upon universal experience, but is clearly deducible from the nature of contracts; that is from the nature of men and things; for a contract between one private man and another would have no validity, the strongest ever endeavouring to break or explain it to his own advantage; so that *an agreement* would turn out to be only another word for an *established contention*, if the laws or superior powers of the society, to which both the covenanting parties are subject, were not always ready at hand to prevent the infringement of the agreement, and to explain whatever happened to be ambiguous in it. By this state of the case it is perfectly clear, that to form a binding contract between Great Britain and America, the two parties must submit themselves to the correction and controll of some third power, such as France or Spain, which would by this means *give law* to both, and become the only sovereign and independent power of the three. *Submission* is a word perfectly intelligible, and *independence* is no less so; but if any one will be
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at the pains to put down upon paper what he means by a *conditional submission* to a sovereign power, and will try to compleat his scheme by providing a legal or constitutional mode of redress, in case any of the parties should exempt itself from its share of the conditions, he will, I am confident, soon discover that he had been in pursuit of what cannot possibly have an existence. When awakened from his dream, if he should ask me which of the two parties was likely to become the dupe of such an agreement, I would answer him firmly, That party which from weakness or fear had taken the first step towards an accommodation; as the same motives which induced them to solicit the treaty, would continue to operate in making them submit to any degree of insolence or injustice in the observance of it.

Whatever new pretensions may be set up in future years, no man has yet presumed, either on this or the other side of the Atlantic, to assert that the legislature of Great Britain never had a Right, at any time, to make laws for binding her colonies
in

in *any case whatsoever* ; or that all her acts of that sort have been, for these two hundred years, acts of tyranny and usurpation. The contrary has been hitherto universally admitted ; and as I have already shewn that there can be no line drawn by which the obedience of subjects to a Supreme legislative power can be limited, but that it must either have a right to *bind them in all cases whatsoever*, as it is expressed in the declaratory Act of Parliament, or *in no case whatsoever*, it follows that the war now carried on to enforce this unlimited obedience is a just and necessary war.

Having thus shewn that the American pretensions to Independency are unjust, that the establishment of such an Independency would be fatal to Great Britain, and that the notion of a *binding compromise* is absurd, there remains no course for Great Britain but that of compelling the Americans by force to return to their duty and allegiance. To the obtaining this end nothing can be more obstructive than any offer of conditions, or any step towards a treaty of accommodation ; and it is past a doubt that much of the

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arrogance

arrogance of the Americans, and much of our bad success against them, have been owing to the offers of this kind already made. Happily for us the Americans are too much puffed up with their late success to listen to any terms of accommodation. Had they the temper and address to enter into any treaty, by which our forces might be withdrawn, and their own trade, fishery, agriculture and manufactures restored, with some new liberties, they would soon be in a better condition to despise us than they are at present.

So far I believe there are thousands of sensible people who will go along with me, but will immediately ask, *How are these Americans to be subdued? The experiment, they say, has been already tried, by very brave troops, commanded by officers of acknowledged bravery and military skill, and yet the success has been so bad as to give us no prospect of a favourable issue.* It is impossible to deny the truth of this observation; but it will be found, upon a nearer view, to arise, not from the general nature of the war between us and the Americans,

Americans, but from the improper mode in which this war has been hitherto carried on.

There is a certain pedantry, or technical importance, which haunts, more or less, the professors of every art; which makes each of them overvalue his own, and often apply it to purposes for which it is very unfit. A great Admiral is easily inclined to believe that there is no better method of reducing a froward people to submission than by a powerful fleet; but if the enemy happen to have no fleet to encounter, and no sea ports that are easily bombarded, he is immediately at the end of his Latin; and, having nothing to do, concludes that there is nothing at all to be done. A great Engineer, were the conduct of the whole business left to him, might perhaps spend a whole summer in making lines of circumvallation, and contravallation, about some insignificant town; and finding that the taking of it very little promoted the general purpose, would be apt to declare the purpose itself unattainable; while a great General would assure us, that, to subdue any people, you must

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employ

employ the firelock and bayonet in the field, and that all other means were ineffectual. In this likewise his Excellency, like the rest, may! be grossly mistaken; for the same effect may be produced by many other kinds of distress, which, without immediately affecting men's lives, might make their lives restless and uncomfortable. For instance, let us suppose a man endowed with the strange faculty of hindering any number of people from sleeping, as long as he pleased, he himself being all the while unsusceptible of hurt: it is evident that such a man, having announced his intention of exerting this power upon all the inhabitants of Great Britain, might sit quietly in his garret, and, without demanding any thing of any body, have, in less than a fortnight, all the lives, liberties, and properties of the nation laid at his feet. In order to be relieved from this painful interdict, they would probably begin by making him what they thought advantageous offers, which he might as readily reject by a bare shake of his head, till, as their distress encreased, they would surrender every thing

thing to his discretion, without stipulation or reserve. It was by methods founded upon this principle that the Legislature of Great Britain attempted to bring back the people of Boston to a sense of their duty, after some of them had injured the British subjects in their private property, in a manner that bid defiance to the Government itself, and after an Assembly of the Province, instead of punishing the offenders, had formally and deliberately applauded the outrage. The Boston port act, and that for suspending the New England fishery, were humanely meant to prevent the shedding of blood, and, in the stead of it, to lay an interdict upon the property of the delinquents, as in the common practice of distraining, till such time as they should conform themselves to the will of that Supreme power to which they had always before that time acknowledged themselves to be subject. The nature of the remedy was well understood, but the dose was too weak to have its desired operation. It served only to irritate, but gave no distress, beyond what was easily counter-

counterbalanced by the passions of the people, and by the promises of assistance daily sent them by their partizans in England ; while the English ministry, trusting to such feeble means of coercion, gave the seditious time to form confederacies, and to prepare every thing for a serious and important war.

To dwell long upon the reflection of what has been improperly done, or what has been improperly neglected, serves only to give ourselves fruitless uneasiness. The manly and sensible part is to consider what may still be done, and to execute it with spirit and steadiness. To distress the Americans with effect is still in our power, and will ever be so, whilst they inhabit a very extensive coast, and we continue to have the command of the sea that washes it. This great advantage naturally points out to us a mode of making war the very reverse, in all its circumstances, of that which has been adopted, and from which consequently we have reason to expect a much more favourable event.

A man

A man who knows nothing at all of British affairs, but what he learns by reading the dispatches from our Commander in Chief in America, would be naturally induced to believe, that he was sent thither, not for any important national purpose, but only to determine a military wager between him and Mr. Washington, whom he, at the head of a limited and small body of English, had undertaken to fight, with all the Americans gathered together, in any part of America that Mr. Washington should chuse; and that, to give the Americans fair play, he had obliged himself to do nothing that should obstruct their assembling; a mere piece of knight errantry, in which it would be ungenerous and ungallant to avail ourselves of any armour or advantage we might accidentally possess over our antagonists. For what, in examining the detail, has been the late plan of military operations? It was to proclaim protection and security for the persons and goods of all the people of America, who should not be found in the way of our army with weapons in their hands; in order, it should

should seem, that such of them as were best qualified for fighting, might, in full ease of mind, walk off with their muskets to join Mr. Washington, leaving their houses, their families, their geese, and their turkies, to the paternal care of the English General—It was that the Americans who were not immediately wanted in Mr. Washington's camp might, in full security, cultivate their rice and tobacco, to be exchanged in France for arms and ammunition—It was to go in search of Mr. Washington by a tedious navigation, in spite of contrary winds, and of a variety of obstructions natural and artificial—It was to keep a brave English army perfectly inactive upon the sea shore, near their equally inactive ships, wasting their health, and spending immense sums of English money, for the benefit of their enemies ; or it was to make them leave their ships, and their sure means of subsistence, to follow Mr. Washington, and his much more numerous army, as far up the country as he pleased to lead them, through woods, bogs, and fortified passes, exposed to every
ambuscade

ambuscade he had previously laid for them, by which their numbers would be daily diminished, while his would be furnished with daily recruits—It was to lead our army through a country inhabited by a people universally hostile to us, and friendly to Mr. Washington ; who would supply him with fresh provisions and true intelligence, while they fed us with nothing but lyes—It was to march them so far up into the enemy's country, that when, by want of provisions, or the approach of winter, they should be obliged to retreat to their ships, they might be harrassed, retarded, and destroyed in their retreat, with little power of retaliation —It was, through the whole of this business, to consider the Thirteen Rebel Provinces, and their Congress, as a lawful Republic ; without which even our greatest success against their united army would never bring the war to a peaceful settlement, not even a temporary one. In short, it was such a plan of warfare as the sly Dr. Franklyn would have suggested to our Admiral and

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General,

General, if ever they had been so simple as to give ear to him.

But I, who have much more tenderness for English men than for American turkeys, will suggest a plan of a quite different nature, and shall utter it in by a passage of a letter I received from my brother, a mate in one of General Howe's transports, who, in his relation of what past in sailing up Chesapeak Bay, says, " Upon the west side of the bay
" we saw the coast of Virginia, richly
" adorned with houses and plantations ; and
" it was the opinion of every one, both
" sailors and soldiers, on board our vessel,
" that 2000 men landed here would easily
" lay waste the whole Province : but it seems
" to hurt the Americans, without loss or
" danger to ourselves, is not the present
" system of politics."

Thus far my brother ; but why it should not be the present system is hard to say, except its being so obviously easy and safe has made it to be overlooked by men of refining heads. Whether it be in reality so safe and easy will best appear by reducing it from a
general

general idea to an actual plan of operations ; such as the following :

To assemble all the British troops now in America at New York, which is to serve as the general rendezvous, the magazine for our stores, and the hospital for our sick and wounded.

To draw up and print a Proclamation, to be separately addressed to each of the Thirteen Rebel Provinces, and to be delivered to the magistrate, or ruling men of the capital towns of each Province, to the following purport ;

WHEREAS certain evil-disposed persons have of late years entered into an unlawful and traiterous confederacy against the crown and dignity of his majesty King George, and the supreme legislature of Great Britain, under the name of a Congress ; and whereas of the members who compose the said traiterous confederacy, to wit,

pretend to be elected for that purpose by the whole proprietors of the

the Province of _____, thereby endeavouring to involve all and every one of the inhabitants of the said Province in the great guilt, and to subject them to the heavy penalties, of high treason and rebellion ; the which report his Majesty, from a tender regard of the lives and properties of so many of his subjects, is unwilling, without further proof, to believe. It is therefore his Majesty's pleasure, that the inhabitants of the said Province of _____ shall, by a public Act of their Assembly, to be held at _____ as soon as conveniently may be, disavow the pretended representation of their Province, by the said pretended deputies, and to communicate the said disavowal, in an authentic manner, to his Majesty's governor, or commanding officer, at New York, on or before the _____ day of _____ ; in which case his Majesty is graciously pleased to grant pardon to all the inhabitants of the Province of _____, excepting the said pretended deputies, for all acts of treason, or misprision of treason, committed by them against his Majesty, and the State of
Great

Great Britain, previous to the said disavowal. But if, by non-compliance with this his Majesty's gracious proclamation, the inhabitants of —— are so infatuated as to acknowledge the persons aforesaid to be really their representatives, and thereby take upon themselves all the guilt of the war that has been waged, and of the blood that has been spilt by their orders, it is his Majesty's firm resolution to compel a compliance with this his just and merciful requisition, by laying waste the houses, lands, and goods of the said inhabitants of the Province of ——, wherever they are to be found.

An unconditional compliance with the terms of the above Proclamation, would put an end to the war, though not in the manner that would give a prospect of a lasting peace; as a war raised by the individuals themselves, and finished without those individuals being made to feel any of the miseries of it, would have a great chance of being revived upon the first frivolous pretence. The cheapest and best garrison for keeping any distant people

people in obedience is the remembrance of what they have suffered by their former contumacy, and the fear of having those severities repeated; especially when they see that they may be repeated with little danger or expence to those who inflict them. There being, however, but little likelihood of their compliance with a bare requisition of this sort, some more coercive means must be employed; such as,

To leave at New York an army so numerous as to be in no danger from an attack.

To embark 10,000 men on board transports properly escorted, and commanded by an experienced officer, who has never suffered his brain to be perplexed by factious reasonings about the Rights of government, but holds the laws of his country, and the commands of his King, as the infallible rule of his conduct.

That this army, leaving Mr. Washington to amuse himself in the woods, shall be transported, without any thing being previously known of its particular destination, to any part of any of the rebel Provinces, which,

which, from the particular state of the wind at the time, the easiness of landing, or other circumstances, shall seem the most eligible.

When come to their destined place, the troops to be landed ; and after having carried away all that may be useful for the public service, to burn and destroy the houses, magazines and plantations, as far as they are conveniently within their reach ; sparing the lives of all the persons who do not attempt by arms to prevent them.

This service being performed, the troops once more to embark for some other province, where the like may be repeated.

These seem to be all the instructions necessary to be given to a commander in such an expedition. All that is required of him for this service is a moderate steady temper, a strict observance of the common rules of military discipline, and a due caution in landing and re-imbarking the troops, in which our sea-faring men have great experience.

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Let us next see what are likely to be the more immediate consequences of this amphibious mode of making war.

First, General Washington's army would immediately melt away like a snow-ball before a fire. Every man, more anxious for the safety of his own family, than for the ideal independency of America, would return to his own Province, either to assist in defending his own property ; or, if that should not be found practicable, in saving as much of it as he could, either by hiding, or carrying it away.

Secondly, these strokes of severity, though they might, in fact, fall but upon a very few, would give universal terror and anxiety to all the inhabitants of America : and it is from this anxiety, that the most powerful effect is to be expected ; for in comparison of it real damage is but a small evil, as experience has often shewn. People who had lost their goods, would be rid at the same time of their fears, and would be perhaps the only inhabitants upon that extended coast

coast who would enjoy the blessing of a sound sleep.

Thirdly, To repel these mischiefs, to be performed by 10,000 men only, all America must be in arms. Every one of the Thirteen Rebel Provinces must have an army at least double the number of ours; that is to say, Rebel America must have in the field an army of 260,000 men, with thirteen Commanders in chief, and a proportionate number of inferior officers; which is more than the united powers of France and Spain would be able to bring into the field, although they should evacuate all their garrisons for that purpose. If the army of 20,000 men, which I allot for the defence of each Province, were to be made up of men hastily got together from their usual labour, upon the appearance of our troops upon the coast, they could only meet them as sheep to be slaughtered. If, on the other hand, they should be constantly disciplined as soldiers, and kept in a body for many months together, in perpetual readiness to repel a possible invasion, a ruin of another sort would

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soon ensue. A late ingenious French writer upon Public Felicity, says, "That no nation
" can bear the expence of an army, if more
" than one man out of a hundred is em-
" ployed in the military service." I will not take upon me to answer for the exactness of his calculation, but I am sure that a nation of all soldiers would soon become a nation of all beggars. Neither could a regular army, more powerful than ours, prevent the threatened mischief, except by strange accident it happened to be encamped within eight or ten miles of the spot, which our General had chosen for his landing place.

This last assertion may be illustrated by calling to mind what happened in 1758; when a body of English troops, to the number of 6000, made three different descents upon the coast of France; where, though so small a number could not prudently wait the assembling of the French forces from distant parts, yet, the fact is, that they were long enough on shore to have burnt Cherbourg, and all the villages, and houses, for
many

many miles round their several landing places, if such had been their instructions. That they had no instructions for such mischief arose from this plain reason; that it would have been cruel, unmerited, and useless; or, to speak more properly, it would have been cruel, because unmerited and useless. Every degree of pain, even the smallest, given to individuals, without having in view any useful, or humane end, is an act of cruelty, which no just or wise man will ever recommend, or countenance. The country people on the coast of France had no vote in making war upon England; nor could their fears, or lamentations, contribute to put an end to it. It is not so with the inhabitants of America; for they, with the express purpose of making war upon England, have formed themselves into a Government, the most popular imaginable, in which every man is, as it were, a Counsellor of state; as there every man by himself, or his representative in Congress, *grants* money for carrying on war, and orders the mode in which this money is to be expended;

where every man may be said, in his own individual person, to have bid defiance to the King of Great Britain ; so that he must thank his own folly and temerity, if, at any time, he should come off short from so unequal a contest.

I have insensibly digressed a little from my main subject, which was only to shew how the Americans may be subdued to obedience with little loss or danger to us. But the digression may not be altogether useless ; as a scheme for securing the public, at the expence of private people altogether innocent, would be ill relished by the more humane, and more respectable part of the community.

In farther considering the immediate effects to be expected from this new mode of making war, in America, it may be useful to observe what actually are the effects of that now practised. It will be then found, that none of the inconveniencies the Americans now suffer are of such a nature as to make any violent impression upon their minds, or to raise up any new passion
sufficient

sufficient to counteract those with which they have enflamed one another. Every one, indeed, pays his quota in money towards the maintainance of the war against England; but nobody feels any pain from the war, except the few who, for the sake of the pay, or from a love of idleness, and squabbling, actually engage to carry arms. These men may be killed, they may be wounded, but they make no lamentation for themselves, nor does any body make lamentation for them. They are the admiration of their party, and the objects of the praise of men, women, and children. When they fall, or are disabled, others are easily found, from the same motives, to supply their places: and a war of this sort may glide on, from year to year, till both England and America would be so impoverished and enfeebled as to become an easy prey to their ambitious neighbours.

But the same men, women, and children, who would rejoice to hear of a small advantage gained over the English forces, at the expence of three or four thousand of their
own

own soldiers, would set up a most piteous howling, on seeing their own cattle driven away, and their own chairs, tables, and feather beds set in a blaze. In whatever Province, or part of a Province, such severities might be first exercised, the distress and confusion would be soon communicated to all the rest. The immediate sufferers, or those most immediately in danger of suffering, would apply for defence to their neighbours; who, having the like evils to apprehend, would not be able to afford them any. They would apply for relief in their wants; but they would apply to those, whose affairs were already disordered, and who had nothing to spare. Mutual blame and reproaches would naturally ensue, and great part of them would fall upon the members of the Congress as the chief instigators of the revolt. The confederacy which had been formed for their common safety would be found to produce nothing but universal danger. The chimerical fears of oppression, from the unlimited authority of the parliament of Great Britain, would soon be

be defaced by the actual mischiefs they felt from their refusal to submit to it ; and each Province, without consulting their Congress, would return to its former duty ; leaving the extent of that duty, as formerly, to the moderation of the British government, and the known justice and benevolence of the British nation.

These are my reasons, in support of what I apprehend to be the most effectual method of subduing the Americans ; and which has this further to recommend it, that it cannot be prevented from taking place by an open declaration of France in their favour ; since the same fleet and army which are necessary for making head against the French in the West-Indies will be able to do all the service I have pointed out, when they are not employed in business of greater importance ; while the constant and universal expectation of the landing of our troops, even though they should never land, would serve no less to disable the Americans from assisting the French, than if we actually laid their whole country waste.

It

It will be probably objected to the foregoing plan of operations, that though it should at last procure submission to the government of Great Britain, the affections of the Americans would be entirely lost by it. To this objection a short answer might be made, by barely repeating the old proverb, that *Nought is never in danger*; the minds of the Americans being already so hostile to this country that no conduct of ours has a chance of making them more so. But this is not a compleat answer, nor all that may be said upon the subject. Whatever may be the various springs, or motives of the affection which one private person bears to another, the affection of subjects to their Supreme Rulers has ever been derived from one single and uniform cause, and that is, the contemplation of their uncontrollable power. From this is immediately derived fear and awe, the awe produces respect, and the respect soon creates a passion so like affection, that it has not been thought necessary to find any other name for it. Those who believe that affection is only attendant upon
virtuous

virtuous, and kind Rulers, and that it is the overflowings of gratitude for their paternal care, have paid little attention to the facts recorded in history; else they would have found that this affection, which is often denied to the most virtuous, humane, and well intentioned Princes, has been bestowed with the most ardent enthusiasm upon the most vicious, useless, and profligate.

By alluding to these facts I do not mean to insinuate that it was the vices or tyranny of those Princes which recommended them to the affections of the people; on the contrary, I am confident, that the very opposite qualities and behaviour would have rendered them more amiable. It is the unlimited power—that image of Divinity—which has always been the object of public adoration, and will always be so, in whatever hands it is placed. Notwithstanding the uncommon mildness and beneficence of the British government in America, the Americans always had a great affection for the King and the Parliament of Great Britain, till the repeal of the Stamp-act in 1766. Then it was that they discovered,

for the first time, that the British power was very far from having that political omnipotence it had pretended to ; but that, on the contrary, it was infirm and tottering, torn to pieces by faction, and that the nature of its Constitution was such as did not enable it to resent the most gross insults from the seditious within its own Capital, much less those which might be offered at three thousand miles distance. With the knowledge of the weakness of our Government all their former reverence for it ceased ; and as every new transaction gave new proofs of this weakness, their respect turned into contempt, which has since been wrought up, by little and little, to a most perfect hatred. That passionate attachment mentioned above, of subjects to persons whom they suppose possessed of unlimited power, seems to be one of those instincts wisely given by the Author of our being, both to encourage and to enable supreme Rulers to keep up the opinion of mankind with respect to its reality, by a vigilant and strict execution of the laws which

which exist in every State against those who, by any act of defiance, attempt to bring that power into question. This vigilance is of the utmost consequence to the peace of society, as a contempt once conceived for the power of any Government can never be removed but by extraordinary and violent exertions, which are always fatal to many individuals, and sometimes dangerous to the State itself. Such, however, is our present disagreeable situation, of which I have endeavoured to point out both the cause and the cure. Towards the execution of my own plan I have nothing to contribute but my good wishes, which will always attend every man, who, by thought, word, or deed, lends his assistance in restoring Great Britain to her former splendor and dignity.

Z E R O.

Greenwich Hospital,

Jan. 6, 1778.

